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Picture-Proofs and Greek Construction 
0. Introduction 
Justification in mathematics is a very particular thing; no other field has such high 
standards placed on the notion of 'proof. There is justification and there is evidence. 
That non-deductive methods have long been seen as belonging to the latter category is 
uncontroversial. One contrarian to this view is Brown and his belief in a kind of non-
deductive justification he calls 'picture-proofs'. Brown's most recent and thorough 
treatment of picture-proofs is found in Philosophy of Mathematics: A Contempormy 
Introduction to the World of ProofS and Pictures published in 2008; the discussions 
contained therein will form the basis for this paper. This belief in picture-proofs will 
be placed in the context of the highly visual culture of Greek mathematics and 
through this, conclusions will be drawn about the validity and usefulness of these 
picture-proofs. Sections 1-3 will be devoted to the discussion of picture-proofs and 
Brown's argument for their existence. In this discussion, further arguments will be 
provided to supplement Brown's own with the view to establishing the strongest 
possible account of picture-proofs. Section 4 will consider the role of pictures in 
Greek mathematics and will introduce the question of whether Brown's interpretation 
of pictures has a place within Greek mathematics. Section 5 will clearly state what it 
means to assess Brown's view in the context of Greek mathematics. Following this, 
an attempt will be made to argue that Brown's views are consistent with Greek 
mathematics. Section 6 will attempt to bring these ideas together in an example from 
Euclid. Finally, Section 7 will discuss the state of picture-proofs given the conclusions 
so far drawn from the paper. 
1. Brown's Picture-Proofs 
Brown (2008) begins with this controversial statement: "Pictures can prove theorems" 
(p. 26). In order to show this, he makes a subtle but significant change to the ordinary 
view of things. If a picture 1 is used in a proof, then the standard view of its purpose is 
to supply the evidence on which to base a conjecture. A symbolic proof2 is then 
supplied and the conjecture is now a theorem. Hence, the symbolic proof is seen to 
have established a heretofore uncertain theorem. The picture was simply an aid to 
understanding or a nudge in the right direction. Brown disagrees. He claims instead 
that the picture is a reliable method of proof and establishes the theorem in its own 
right3. Instead of the mathematician fonnalising what can be grasped from the picture, 
the mathematician is simply finding an alternative route (namely, the traditional 
symbolic method) to proving the theorem. Hence, in this instance, the already 
established theorem is confitming that the mathematician's symbolic proof was 
conect4. That is, the theorem is proved by the picture, and so the "independently-
lmown-to-be-true" (Brown, 2008, p. 30) theorem confirms a symbolic proof because 
1Throughout this paper, 'picture' will be used in place of 'diagram' as Brown uses this terminology 
almost exclusively. The significance of this use of terminology will later be discussed. 
2 All that is meant by a symbolic proof is the rigourous verbal, symbolic and logical apparatus through 
which the mathematician establishes the truth of a conjecture. 
3 This does not mean, however, that all pictures are capable of proving theorems; only that some can. 
4 By this, Brown (2008) means "The other (the analytic proof) is questionable, but our confidence in it 
as a technique is greatly enhanced by the fact that it agrees with the reliable method [the picture]" (p. 
166). 
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the symbolic proof arrives at something true; namely, the theorem. The picture-proof 
is not simply an aid to understanding, but as good as the symbolic proof itself. 
A symbolic proof is the means of establishing a theorem by excluding all other logical 
possibilities arising from the premises of the proof. That is, by its very nature, the 
symbolic proof establishes the generality of a result by excluding the mere possibility 
of an alternative. The picture-proof, by contrast, must have a different answer for 
generality. A mathematical picture is by necessity a picture of a single case; a picture 
cannot at once represent all possible cases and so prove a result. Brown asks the 
reader to consider the following example, that is, the Intermediate Value Theorem (or 
more specifically, its corollary the Intermediate Zero Theorem): 
y 
This picture represents a single function; that is, a specific case of the Intermediate 
Zero Theorem. Clearly, for this continuous function over the interval [a,b], it holds 
that f changed from negative to positive and there is some c between a and b such that 
f(c)=O. This is evidence for the conjecture that, if for some continuous function f on 
the interval [ a,b] and iff changes from negative to positive (or vice versa), then there 
is a c between a and b such that f( c )=0. The Intermediate Zero Theorem, first proved 
symbolically by Bolzano, states that this is always the case. Brown claims that the 
above picture is, in fact, a picture-proof; the picture does not merely provide grounds 
for the conjecture. In terms of Brown's distinction mentioned above, the picture 
already proved the theorem and Balzano's proof was confirmed by the already 
established theorem. Bolzano and many other mathematicians would instead claim 
that the picture was simply evidence for the conjecture, but Bolzano supplied the first 
rigourous proof. Balzano's proof, by its very nature, proved the generality ofthe 
theorem, that is, that the theorem holds for all continuous functions f. The above 
picture shows a specific function f, yet Brown claims it is a picture-proof of the 
Intermediate Zero Theorem and so it must establish the generality of that theorem. 
That is, the picture, while only showing a specific function f, must prove the result for 
all functions. Brown's solution to this will be discussed in the following two sections. 
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A possible objection here is to claim that Brown and Bolzano are using different 
notions of continuity: Balzano is using the epsilon-delta definition and Brown is using 
the idea of pencil continuity, that is, a line being drawn without the pencil leaving the 
page. There are at least two possible responses here: firstly, Brown's (2008) response 
is to claim that "it would be a mistake to infer that the results of the two proofs are 
incommensurable" (p. 30). He argues that if the two notions of continuity were not 
somehow deeply related, then illustrating Balzano's theorem with a picture or 
applying Balzano's results to situations in geometly would be nonsensical in the first 
place. A second response would be to argue that Balzano's notion of continuity is a 
formalisation of Brown's geometric notion. In this sense, the accuracy of Bolzano' s 
proof would be established by it agreeing with the pictorial notion. Through either 
argument, it appears difficult to claim that the different notions of continuity are too 
different to say anything worthwhile about the relationship between symbolic and 
picture proof. 
2. Platonism & Mathematical Objects 
To Brown (2008), the solution to the problem of generality is that "some 'pictures' are 
not really pictures, but rather are windows to Plato's heaven" (p. 40). Before 
explaining Brown's position more fully, it is first necessary to consider platonism5• To 
Brown (2008), "The essential ingredient [of contemporary platonism] is the existence 
and accessibility of the forms themselves, in particular the mathematical forms" (p. 
10). So, he is not concerned with any literal interpretation of Plato's heaven, but is 
concerned with contemporary platonism, which "is the view that there exist such 
things as abstract objects- where an abstract object is an object that does not exist in 
space or time and which is therefore entirely non-physical and non-mental" (Balageur, 
2009, introduction section, para. 1). The mathematical forms mentioned in the above 
quote from Brown are these abstract objects. A platonic form is the common thread 
between objects. That is, an apple is an apple because it is the instantiation ofthe form 
of an apple. The form of the apple is something like a perfect blueprint for an apple 
and all physical apples are simply imperfect deviations. So, two apples which are not 
entirely similar, but still seem to have common properties, are called the same 
because they instantiate the platonic form of an apple. This holds tme for 
mathematical objects. A circle drawn on a blackboard is the instantiation of the 
perfect circle form. The circle on the blackboard is fine to be getting along with, but it 
is the perfect circle form which is being considered in any calculations or 
mathematical uses of the circle. 
This contemporary brand of platonism is by no means universally accepted. An 
obvious objection is to claim that the leap to abstract objects is a dubious one. After 
all, abstract objects by definition can never be evidenced, so why should anyone 
suppose their existence? A common approach to this, which Brown (2008) adopts, is 
to claim that "We have mathematical knowledge and we need to explain it; the best 
explanation is that there are mathematical objects and that we can 'see' them" (p. 15). 
Brown expands little on this idea, but a further argument is needed to avoid simply 
assuming that what is tme and what is the best explanation are the same. 
5 Throughout this paper, contemporaty versions of the doctrine of Platonism will be spelt with a lower 
case 'p'; platonism. This is to avoid the equivocation of Platonism as Plato himself would have 
understood it and platonism in a more modern sense. 
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To expand upon Brown's argument above, it will be useful here to defer to the notion 
of 'the inference to the best explanation' 6; a form of abductive reasoning7. The idea is 
this: it is reasonable to assume the existence of an entity for the explanation of 
phenomena if and only if the supposed entity only has properties attributed to it which 
are of explanatory relevance to the stated phenomena. In terms of Brown's argument, 
the question becomes: do platonic mathematical objects only have properties 
attributed to them of explanatory relevance to mathematical knowledge? The answer 
is quite clearly yes. Platonic mathematical objects are, by definition, the abstraction 
from mathematical knowledge. That is, the platonic mathematical object of a circle is 
simply the abstraction of the blackboard circle. So, the mathematical object has all of 
the necessary prope1iies of a circle as if it exhibited any non-necessary properties, the 
object would be of a specific, rather than general, nature. It is a mathematical object, 
so it cannot be representing a specific case. Therefore, the mathematical object only 
has mathematical properties ascribed to it which are necessary in order for it to be the 
abstraction of its instantiation. Furthermore, it is necessary that mathematical objects 
are non-mental, non-physical and outside of space and time (that is, they have always 
existed and always will) because otherwise mathematics would not be certain; there 
would be no mathematical truths because all of the above are finite. If mathematical 
objects were mental constructions, then when humans die so too the mathematics they 
have created. If the mathematical objects were physical, existing in space and time, 
they would also be finite. If mathematical truth is to be ce1iain, this cannot be the 
case. Finally, the mathematical objects must be causally ine1i because it is impossible 
to interact in any way with an object defined as non-mental, non-physical and outside 
of space and time. It is worth considering what is meant by mathematical objects 
being 'causally ine1i'. It is often supposed that in order to know something, the person 
doing the knowing must have some causal relationship with that something. For 
example, "If I know that Mary is wearing a red shili, it is because I am in causal 
contact: photons from Mary enter my eyes, and so on" (Brown, 2008, p. 17). As 
mathematical objects are non-mental, non-physical and exist outside of space and 
time, it is impossible that this sort of causal relationship could take place. There is 
simply no way for the mathematician to form such a relationship with these abstract 
objects. 
The above discussion leaves a choice between abstract mathematical objects or the 
uncertainty of mathematical choice. Most mathematicians would be more comfmiable 
having abstract mathematical objects than giving up the view that mathematics is 
certain, so the above arguments for the relevance of the prope1iies of mathematical 
objects appears to be acceptable. Hence, the conditions of the 'inference to the best 
explanation' have been satisfied. Having formalised Brown's reasoning somewhat, it 
appears then that the leap from mathematicallmowledge to mathematical objects is at 
least reasonable. 
The above does not deal with the more impmiant problem: how can the 
mathematician know something without being causally related to that something? 
That is, mathematicians somehow 'use' mathematical objects, but how can they 
6 See Harman. 
7 Abductive reasoning is a form reasoning which infers an 'economical' explanation from an 
incomplete set of information. By 'economical', it is meant that all parts of the explanation are 
necessary to explain the set of information. 
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gather information from this process without somehow being causally related to the 
mathematical object? Brown attempts to deal with this by citing an example from 
quantum physics in which an experiment is conducted and information can be gained 
without a causal relationship. This is an unconventional approach and relies perhaps 
too heavily on current theories. As Brown (2008) himself notes:"[ ... ] arguments like 
this are problematic. It relies on significant assumptions about the physical world" (p. 
18) and " [ ... ] the assumptions that go into the physics of this situation are at least as 
plausible, or even more plausible, than the assumptions involved in the causal theory 
ofknowledge. It seems perfectly sensible to dump the latter" (p.19). So, in light of 
this uncertainty, it seems necessary to consider other responses to the problem of 
causal accessibility. 
A proposed solution to the problem of accessibility which, it will be argued, appears 
to tie in well with pictures is that ofBalageur (1998). Balaguer believes that all 
possible abstract mathematical objects exist. From this, he argues that any 
mathematical theory which is internally consistent is then 'picking out' the 
mathematical objects to deal with. As a result, the mathematician does not need to 
have a causal relationship with mathematical objects; instead, the mathematician must 
formulate internally consistent mathematical theories which pick out the existing 
mathematical objects. In this way, "we can acquire knowledge of abstract 
mathematical objects without the aid of any sort of contact with such objects" 
(Balaguer, 1998, p.49). 
In order to apply this to pictures, it is first necessary to note that an imperfect circle 
drawn on a blackboard cannot be an abstract object. Only the perfect platonic forms 
exist as abstract objects. Consider: An imperfect circle is drawn on a blackboard. 
There is nothing internally inconsistent about this. If, however, the imperfect circle is 
supposed to pick out an existing and imperfect abstract object of a circle, then 
ordinary uses and theorems about circles would no longer be consistent (e.g., 
radius=circumference/2*pi). This is worth noting because otherwise, on Balaguer's 
view, the mathematician could use pictures to pick out imperfect mathematical 
objects. Such a use of mathematical objects would result in mathematical systems 
being internally inconsistent and thus pictures could never access Plato's heaven. As a 
result of this, visual pictures would seem to 'pick out' their Platonic form. It appears 
then that Balaguer's view is open to pictures accessing their platonic forms and 
furthermore, provides a solution to the problem of accessing these platonic forms. 
3. The Generality of Picture-Proofs 
Consider two pictures related to the Intetmediate Zero Theorem: 
f(b) --------------------
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For each picture, the theorem quite clearly holds; that is, the function fmust at some 
point c between a and b equal zero. According to Brown, the platonic form which is 
the common bond between these pictures is the proof of generality. The line of 
reasoning is this: each picture is a proof and each picture is an instantiation of the 
same platonic form. Through each picture, the mathematician can 'grasp' the platonic 
form. So, if the platonic form can be grasped through the picture, it follows that the 
result (Intermediate Zero Theorem) proved by the picture holds for the platonic form. 
Hence, if the platonic form is something like a blueprint for all of its instantiations, 
then the pictures instantiated from this blueprint must consist of the same properties. 
So, through either of the above pictures, the platonic form can be grasped. The 
Intermediate Zero Theorem holds for the pictures and so it holds for the platonic 
form. The platonic form is the abstraction for all possible functions under the 
conditions of the proof, so the Intermediate Zero Theorem must hold for all possible 
functions under the conditions of the proof. Hence, the platonic form has established 
the generality of the result. 
It is worth considering what Brown means when he uses vague terms like 'grasp'. To 
Brown (2008), "[ ... ] it [the picture-proof] works in a different way, more like an 
instrument. [ ... ] As telescopes help the unaided eye, so some diagrams are 
instruments rather than representations which help the unaided mind's eye" (p. 40). 
Futihetmore, "We can intuit mathematical objects and grasp mathematics truths. 
Mathematical entities can be 'seen' or 'grasped' with 'the mind's eye"' (p. 14). So it 
appears then that seeing a picture with the unaided eye is parallel to grasping the 
platonic form with the mind's eye. This might seem incorrect; seeing a picture with 
the unaided eye is a physical process which is understood. Brown here replies that, 
though the physiology of the process is well understood, the rest is not. The mind-
body problem, that is, the relationship between the physical input (what is seen) and 
the mental reaction is by no means solved. Brown (2008) concludes: "[ ... ] our 
ignorance in the mathematical case is no worse than our ignorance in the case of 
everyday objects" (p. 16). 
It is possible to raise cetiain objections about Brown's view of picture proofs working 
like an instrument. Folina (1999) has replied to Brown, saying: "telescopes are not 
themselves justificatory: it is not the telescope which is cited as the primary 
justification for an astronomical claim" (p. 426). Folina then goes on to argue that, 
despite Brown claiming to show that pictures can prove things, he is instead showing 
that only the abstract objects can do the proving. That is, "it seems that although he 
wants to call them 'proofs', visual pictures do not justify general mathematical 
claims; only mental, or abstract, 'pictures' can prove such appropriate evidence" 
(Folina, 1999, p. 426). In this sense, the visual picture is heuristic; it helps the 
mathematician to understand or access both the abstract picture and the symbolic 
proof. This objection will be returned to and expanded upon in section 7. 
4. The Role of Pictures in Greek Mathematics 
If Brown is correct in his view of pictures and if pictures play a vital role in Greek 
mathematics, then this motivates the question: Does Brown's interpretation of 
pictures have a place within Greek mathematics and if not, what are the consequences 
of this for Brown's view? The rest of the paper will deal with this question. Firstly, 
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the role of pictures in Greek mathematics must be investigated and defined; that is the 
goal of this section. 
An important part of the historical work ofNetz8 (2005) on Greek mathematics is to 
show that picture and proof exist together in such a way that "Rather than one of them 
governing the other, the text and diagram present, let us say, a cohabitation" (p. 171). 
That is to say, the picture and proof are logically dependent upon one another. Netz 
establishes this through a detailed survey of the lettering of a diagram. Surviving 
Greek proofs refer to the conesponding diagram by means of refetTing to letters 
added to the diagram at useful places, such as the intersection of two lines. Netz 
distinguishes four kinds of specification through which the diagram is given its letters. 
Firstly,full specification is a specification of letters such that the text perfectly 
determines the letters. For example, a statement like, "Let A be the centre of a circle" 
is a full specification because there can be only one possible centre. Secondly, under 
specification is the specification of letters such that the text is not sufficient to be 
certain of its meaning; it is necessary to also inspect the picture. For example, "Let 
there be a circle so that BC is the radius of the circle" is under specified because the 
statement alone is not sufficient to establish whether B or C is the centre of the circle. 
Thirdly, un-specification is the lack of specification of letters. For example, "Let there 
be a circle so that BC is the radius of the circle. I say that BD is twice BC" is a case of 
un-specification because D is not specified at all. Lastly, pre specification is a 
specification of letters such that the specification is gradually defined. That is, the 
specification may begin as un-specified and become under or fully specified or the 
specification may begin as under specified and become fully specified. All of these 
kinds of specifications except full specification are instances where the picture is 
relied upon, so that, "the reader went beyond what was given in the text, and related 
the letters to the points as they appear in the configuration of the diagram" (Netz, 
2005, p. 168). In this sense, the picture precedes the proof and the proof assumes the 
picture. Furthermore, through his survey of Greek texts, Netz claims that most letters 
are not completely specified. As a result, Netz (1998) concludes that "Without 
diagrams, objects lose their reference; so, obviously, assertions lose their truth-value. 
Ergo, part of the content is supplied by the diagram, and not solely by the text. The 
diagram is not just a pedagogic aid, it is a necessary logical component" (p.34). 
The subject of generality is a more difficult one. Despite the attempt to apply Brown's 
views to Greek mathematics, rather than to the kind of thinking done by Greek 
mathematicians, it is still worth considering how the Greeks may have considered the 
problem of generality. The explanation ofNetz is built upon work done by Mueller, 
so the view established here is very much shared by the two. The problem, as Mueller 
(1981) states it, is this: "How can one move from an argument based upon a particular 
example to a general conclusion, from an argument about a straight line AB to a 
conclusion about any straight line?" (p. 13). The core of the solution in Greek 
mathematics to this question, so Netz and Mueller argue, is repeatability. The 
argument is this: the Greek proof is constructed in such a way that the structure is 
clearly and easily extendable. That is, the Greek mathematician writes the proof in 
such a way that the mathematical intelligence of the reader can mentally repeat the 
steps for similar cases. Netz (1999) uses the metaphor of a shadow of a proof: "The 
homoios [statements of the form 'similarly we will prove ... '] demands one to glance, 
8 Netz uses 'diagram', rather than 'picture'. The significance of this will be dealt with in section 7. 
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briefly, at the shadow of a proof. That shadow being removed, the result would no 
longer be valid. It is only because we can imagine ourselves going through the proof 
that we allow ourselves to assume its result without that proof' (p. 244). More 
formally, the result will often take the form of a conditional statement. That is, C(x) is 
the set of assumptions, the construction and P(x) is the implication, so that it is hoped 
to prove that C(x) -7 P(x). The actual Greek proof is only proving a specific instance, 
a specific C(a)-7P(a). This, however, is not only a proof that C(a) leads to P(a), but it 
is a proof of the provability ofP(a) on grounds of C(a). This shows that if the 
particular result P derives from the construction C, then the extension from 
C( a)-7 P( a) to C(x)-7 P(x) is justified. Hence, "extendibility refers to the extendibility 
of the particular proof, rather than of the particular result" (Netz, 1999, p. 257). It 
should be emphasised that this method of 'proof is perhaps more a case of 
convincing the reader than the actual justification involved in a proof. That is, a leap 
based on mathematical intelligence may be evidence, but it is not necessarily a proof. 
It is an intuitive notion, as Netz (1999) notes: "Nothing in the practices of Greek 
geometry would suggest that a proof of repeatability is either possible or necessary. 
Everything in the practices of Greek geometry prepares one to accept the intuition of 
repeatability as a substitute for its proof' (p. 269). So, generality is at least partially 
accounted for in the sense that a Greek proof is constructed in such a way to allow 
easy repeatability. Hence, the importance of pictures in Greek mathematics and a 
notion of generality in Greek mathematics have both been accounted for. These are 
the two main areas of Brown's view, so this is sufficient to proceed with. 
5. Picture-Proofs and Greek Mathematics 
As has been established, pictures played an essential, logical role in Greek 
mathematical proofs. Given, then, that the Greeks were among the few to treat 
pictures as having a legitimate role, it is wmih considering how this role relates to 
Brown's view of picture-proofs. If it can be shown that Brown's view is consistent 
with Greek mathematics, then something can be said as to the accuracy and scope of 
Brown's theory. If, on the other hand, Brown's view is shown to be inconsistent with 
Greek mathematics, then something can be said as to why his theory fails to include 
the Greek picture. By 'consistent with Greek mathematics', it is not meant that Greek 
mathematicians would agree, sympathise or make use of Brown's picture-proofs. It is 
simply meant that the mathematical results and means of proving them are not 
inconsistent with Brown's view. In order to perform this application, it is first 
necessary to clearly state Brown's view and the impmiant points behind it. Brown 
believes pictures can prove things. The two most important points behind this claim 
are: 
(i) Reassigning the burden of proof The picture-proof is the first proof of the 
theorem available to the mathematician. An attempt at a written proof to a 
corresponding picture-proof is the mathematician having a written proof 
confirmed by the prima facie reliable picture-proof. 
(ii) Platonic answer to generality. The picture-proof attains its generality 
through being a window into Plato's heaven. That is, the picture acts as an 
instrument, like a telescope, for the mathematician to grasp the Platonic 
form of the picture and so prove the generality of the result. 
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To consider the whether Greek mathematics is consistent with picture-proofs is to 
consider whether the above two points are consistent with Greek mathematics. To 
begin with (i), it is clear that the Greek mathematician began with the picture. This is 
the first point in Brown's reassignment; the written proof arises from the picture. The 
evidence for this is from Netz's survey of the specification ofletters in a picture. This 
should be uncontroversial. The following point needing to be established in order for 
(i) to be consistent with Greek mathematics is rather more subtle. Before beginning, 
however, it is worth noting that the below discussion is dealing only with cases where 
the picture acts as a picture-proof. It is sufficient for Brown to be consistent with 
Greek mathematics that only the picture-proof cases hold. There are four ways of 
considering the relationship between diagram and text: 
(a) the text does the proving, 
(b) the picture and text are dependant on one another to prove anything, 
(c) the text is dependent on the picture to prove anything and finally, 
(d) the text or picture can do the proving independent of one another. 
In order for (i) to be consistent with Greek mathematics, it will be shown that it is 
necessary for Brown to reject both (a) and (b). 
Option (a) is the first Brown can reject. He can do so for two reasons. Firstly, Brown 
aims to show that it is pictures that can do the proving. If this is the case, and Brown 
must take it to be so, then option (a) cannot hope to demonstrate that (i) is consistent 
with Greek mathematics because it explicitly denies Brown's main claim that pictures 
can prove theorems. Secondly, from the above, Netz argues convincingly that the 
specification of letters in pictures demonstrates that the text, for the most part, relies 
on the diagram. So, (a) can be rejected. 
Netz's (2005) claims: "Rather than one of them governing the other, the text and 
diagram present, let us say, a cohabitation" (p 171). So, clearly, Netz is in the (b)-
camp. It is worth considering more carefully the approach ofNetz. He argues from the 
assumption that pictures cannot prove, but aims to show nonetheless that pictures play 
an essential, logical role in the proving. This implies that the text is dependent on the 
picture and that the picture relies on the text to prove the content of the picture. The 
picture, unable to prove anything by itself, is dependent on the text. This is 
inconsistent with Brown's view. That is, Brown's reassignment is only correct if the 
diagram is a proof independently of any other evidence. This does not, however, mean 
that Brown's views are inconsistent with Greek mathematics. Netz begins with the 
(implicit) assumption that pictures cannot prove and argues from there. As a result of 
this, though Netz shows that the text is dependent upon the picture, he does not show 
that the picture is dependent upon the text; he assumes this. Because Netz assumes, 
rather than proves, it is possible to dispute this assumption. As Brown's views dispute 
Netz's assumption, Brown does not need to allow that the picture is dependent in any 
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way upon the text. As a result of this, in trying to establish that (i) is consistent with 
Greek mathematics, (b) can be rejected9. 
It appears, then, that (c) and (d) are both consistent with (i). It is worth considering the 
implication ofbeing consistent with two of the options. Firstly, having both options 
open to Brown implies that his views are consistent with two kinds of Greek proofs: 
those in which the text is dependent on the picture and those in which the text and 
picture are independent of one another. If the text is dependent upon a picture because 
of a certain specification of letters in the picture, then even if there can be found 
Greek proofs in which the specification of letters imply that the text does not depend 
on the picture, Brown can account for these kinds of proofs. That is, if there are Greek 
proofs where the text is independent from the picture, Brown can still claim that the 
picture is doing the proving and his reassignment holds. This is because the 
acceptance of (d) allows Brown to account for situations of independence. That (i) is 
consistent with Greek mathematics has thus been shown. A final note: there has been 
no explicitly positive reasons give here as to why this reassignment is justified. The 
only reason perhaps suggested by the above is that the scope of Brown's views covers 
most of the kind of pictures in Greek mathematics. This does not necessarily imply 
that Brown is correct in supposing this reassignment, but the above does suggest that 
he is, at least, supposing nothing inconsistent in doing so. 
To show that (ii) is consistent with Greek mathematics is a matter altogether more 
complicated than the previous. This is not an attempt to argue that the Greek 
mathematician's answer to generality was through a Platonist account, but rather an 
attempt to show that the pictures in Greek mathematics operate in a way consistent 
with Brown's picture-proofs. This is a difficult endeavour for two reasons: firstly, 
Brown gives no express criteria by which to judge whether a picture is indeed a 
picture-proof and secondly, by what means Greek proofs attempt to attain generality 
is a matter not entirely settled. That Brown gives no criteria is something which will 
be referred to again later, but it will be useful now to consider the second point. It was 
earlier argued, through Netz and Mueller, that repeatability is the key to how the 
Greek mathematician accounted for generality and this notion will be used in 
considering the platonist account of generality offered by Brown. 
In order for Greek Mathematics to be consistent with Brown, then the pictures in 
Greek Mathematics which work as 'picture proofs' must be in no way inhibited by the 
practices of Greek Mathematics. So, the question becomes: Is there anything in Greek 
mathematics which inhibits a platonist account of generality? That is to say, is there 
anything in Greek Mathematics which prevents the picture being a representation of 
its platonic form? There appear to be two possible means through which Greek 
Mathematics could prevent a picture representing its platonic form. Firstly, the picture 
could have no form to represent; that is, there is no platonic form corresponding to the 
picture or secondly, there is something 'closed' about the picture which does not 
allow representation. To begin with the former, a picture having no platonic form 
implies that the picture is unique in the sense that it is not a special case of a general 
result10• This means that the argument that Greek Mathematics is inconsistent with a 
platonist account of generality can be rejected because no such unique pictures can 
9 This is not to say that Netz is wrong. This is simply a strategy by which the supporter of Brown may 
avoid the difficulties which arise from Netz's claim of cohabitation. 
10 This does not mean, however, that a picture being unique implies that it has no platonic form. 
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exist in Greek Mathematics. This is because Greek Mathematics attained its generality 
through repeatability and a picture cannot be unique if it is repeatable. The second 
argument, that pictures in Greek Mathematics could be in some way 'closed', is 
rejected as a result of repeatability as well. This is because a proof in Greek 
Mathematics was constructed in such a way that it could easily be repeated for other 
situations of a similar kind. Hence, in this way, the mathematical intelligence of the 
reader could somehow fill in the gaps. It is as a result of this that pictures in Greek 
Mathematics can be seen as being open and inspectable which further implies that 
these pictures cannot be 'closed' and so can represent their platonic fmm. 
If Greek mathematicians rely on this mathematical intelligence to somehow account 
for repeatability, is this not similar to having the mathematical intelligence to see how 
a picture is the instantiation of a platonic form? Of course, none of this mathematical 
intelligence business is justificatory. A proof, in order to be a proof, must involve 
justification. Despite this, the notion of mathematical intelligence seems to suggest 
that, in general, there is something open and inspectable about Greek pictures. This, in 
turn, suggests that Greek pictures are not inconsistent with being the instantiations of 
a platonic form. A leap has been made here from mathematical intelligence applying 
to the repeatability of a proof to mathematical intelligence applying to the 
repeatability of the picture corresponding to that same proof. It is necessary to justify 
this leap. 
Mathematical intelligence is the means by which the reader of Greek mathematics can 
extend a Greek proof, rather than extending the result. That is, the proof is constructed 
in such a way as to allow the mathematical intelligence of the reader to easily grasp 
how the proof could be constructed to account for different cases. The 'cognitive 
background' of this mathematical intelligence is explored by Netz. Netz argues that, 
instead of seeing the variability of the picture as infinite, the Greeks viewed the 
variability of a picture as a finite number of relevant discrete cases. That is, the cases 
in which the possibility of some problems can be supposed and so these cases are 
relevant to understanding the picture and its variability. If the Greeks had the 
mathematical intelligence to inspect a diagram for the relevant variability, then it 
seems permissible to allow them the capacity to consider the 'irrelevant' cases as 
well. For example, suppose there is drawn a picture in which there is a straight line 
bisected by another straight line. If a random point is to be taken along the original 
line, it is worth considering the cases which appear significant: point taken at the 
point of intersection, point taken to one side of the bisection and point taken to the 
other side of the bisection. If the Greeks could realise this kind of variability, then 
simply varying the random point within the relevant cases so that there is an infinite 
number would seem doable. As a result of this, the leap above from one application of 
mathematical intelligence to another is justified. So, if mathematical intelligence is 
important to the generality of Greek proofs, it seems as though this suggests that there 
is something open and inspectable about pictures in Greek Mathematics. As a result of 
this, it cannot be argued that the pictures are 'closed' in the sense that they cannot 
represent their platonic form. This implies that neither of the above means-no 
platonic form or 'closed' picture-through which Greek Mathematics could reject a 
platonic account of generality show that picture-proofs are inconsistent with Greek 
Mathematics. Hence, this demonstrates that Brown's view of pictures is consistent 
with the Greek view of proofs. If Greek mathematics is to be at all consistent, then it 
must be allowed that Brown's views correspond to this consistency. 
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Despite the above appearance of consistency, it is worth noting a slight awkwardness 
when comparing the generality of the proof to the generality of a picture. It has been 
established that the construction of the proof is important in repeatability and 
therefore generality. Brown's view of picture-proofs, however, cannot involve this 
notion of construction. Through the picture, the mathematician 'grasps' the Platonic 
form and so the generality of the picture. This does not hint at the mathematician 
mentally or physically constructing the picture. It is more a case of the mathematician 
receiving information than constructing it. There is no obvious means by which to 
reconcile these notions. This point is not an inconsistency between Greek 
mathematics and Brown, but it is worth nothing for later discussion. 
6. An Example 
At this stage, it is worth considering the application of all of the above in a concrete 
example. That is, through an example from Euclid, the following will be discussed: 
(i) The logical necessity of the picture as deduced from the letter-specifications of 
Netz, (ii) repeatability and generality as deduced from the construction of the proof 
and (iii) the interpretation from the view of picture-proofs as addressed in the 
preceding section. To this end, the following proof and picture are introduced11 : 
Book XIII, Proposition 14 
E 
If an equilateral triangle be inscribed in a circle, the square on the side of the triangle 
is triple ofthe square on the radius ofthe circle. 
Let ABC be a circle, and let the equilateral triangle ABC be inscribed in it; 
I say that the square on one side of the triangle ABC is triple of the square on the 
radius of the circle. 
11 (Heath, 1908, p. 466-7, vol. 3). Items in the square brackets are references to earlier results. 
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For let the centreD of the circle ABC be taken, let AD be joined and carried through to 
E, and let BE be joined. 
Then, since the triangle ABC is equilateral, therefore the circumference BE is a sixth 
part of the circumference of the circle ABC. 
Therefore the circumference BE is a sixth part of the circumference of the circle; 
therefore the straight line BE belongs to a hexagon; therefore it is equal to the radius 
DE. [IV. 15, Por.] 
And, since AE is double of DE, the square on AE is quadruple of the square on ED, 
that is, of the square on BE. 
But the square on AE is equal to the squares on AB, BE [III. 31, 1. 4 7]; therefore the 
squares on AB, BE are quadruple of the square on BE. 
But BE is equal to DE; therefore the square on AB is triple of the square on DE. 
Therefore the square on the side of the triangle is triple of the square of the radius. 
Q.E.D. 
To begin with (i), it will be useful to restate the classifications Netz proposes: fully 
specified, under specified, pre-specified and no specification. The proof begins with 
the assertion "let ABC be a circle". This is a case of pre-specification as, although the 
three points necessary to define a circle have been stated, there is no reason to put 
them anywhere in particular on the circle. At this stage in the proof, A, B and C are all 
under specified. Soon after, however, Euclid states, "let the equilateral triangle ABC 
be inscribed in it". At this point, then, the letters A, B and C have become fully 
specified. It is worth noting that this is not because they must be at certain points on 
the circle independent of one another, but rather that they must be at cetiain points on 
the circle relative to one another. The assetiion "let the centre D of the circle ABC be 
taken" is a clear case of full specification. That is, there is only one possible point at 
which D may exist and so no ambiguity is possible. The case of the letter E is slightly 
more complex. Netz (2005) notes from an observation of a proof in Apollonius that, 
in this kind of example, the picture makes it difficult to realise the specification and 
that "visual information compels itself in an unobtrusive, almost unnoticed way" (p. 
169). It is first necessary to unlearn or unsee where E is placed in the diagram. Then, 
when Euclid asserts, "let AD be joined and canied through to E", it is possible to note 
that this does not asse1i that the point E is at the intersection with the circle. E, then, is 
under specified; the text assetis a line of possible points, not a point at the 
intersection. If this is the case, how then is it possible to reconstruct the picture, or at 
least know that a reconstruction is correct? It is possible to use the entire proposition 
to more accurately reconstruct the picture. This, however, does not mean that, by 
some later point in the proposition, E will be fully specified. That would not be a 
legitimate reading of the text because the latter stages of the proof are meant to derive, 
not define. E is then not a convoluted case of pre-specification, but a genuine case of 
under specification. 
As a result of the above classification of points, it is possible to deduce the logical 
importance of the picture. The process through which A, Band C move from being 
under specified to fully specified in the proof is impmiant to consider. The reader of 
the proof has two possible reactions to an under specified letter: to look at the picture 
or to suspend belief in the hope that the text will later fully specify it. If it is the 
former, then this demonstrates the reliance of text on picture. The latter case seems 
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difficult to justify. That the letter E is never fully specified only re-enforces this point 
further. Without the picture, E is not specified so that the proofs "invalidity consists 
not in contradictions, but in non sequiturs" (Netz, 2005, p. 170). Without the picture, 
the proof leads nowhere. 
Secondly, (ii), that generality and repeatability derive from the construction of the 
proof, is perhaps more obvious than the above. It is first worth breaking down 
Euclid's above proof into its logical components. The first assertion that "If an 
equilateral triangle be inscribed in a circle, the square on the side of the triangle is 
triple of the square on the radius of the circle" is the protasis, the statement of the 
form C(x)-7 P(x). The second assertion "Let ABCbe a circle, and let the equilateral 
triangle ABCbe inscribed in it" is the ekthesis, the statement of the form C(a). The 
following assetiion "I say that the square on one side of the triangle ABC is triple the 
square on the radius of the circle" is the diorismos, the statement of the form P(a). All 
the following assetiions, except the very last, are the kataskeue and apodeixis. The 
kataskeue are the construction statements and the apodeixis are the predicate 
statements. These assertions are ofthe form: C(b), ... , C(n), P(b), ... , P(a). The final 
assetiion, the sumperasma, is simply a repeat ofthe protasis. It is the confirmation of 
what has been proved of the form C(x)-7 P(x). 
The construction formulae, the kataskeue, are those of the type, "let AD be joined and 
carried through E, and let BE be joined". The predicate formulae, the apodeixis, are 
the relations drawn from the construction formula, such as, "therefore the straight line 
BE belongs to a hexagon, therefore it is equal to the radius DE". The generality of the 
result is derived because the kataskeue and apodeixis prove P(a) from C(a). This 
proves, not only that C(a)-7 P(a), but it proves the provability ofP(a) from C(a). In 
doing so, it shows that the C(x)-7 P(x) is justified if the construction formulae are 
situationally independent12 . That is, the mathematical intelligence of the reader allows 
for the extension from C(a)-7 P(a) to C(x)-7 P(x). More concretely, it can be easily 
seen from Euclid's above proof how the text could be altered to account for a 
different case. The essence of this easy extendibility derives from the 'construction to 
predicate' structure of the proof. 
Lastly, (iii), the interpretation of Brown, in this case is perhaps obvious: the picture is 
the proof and the text is confirmed by the already known to be true proof of the 
picture. There is more subtlety to this than is at first apparent. It had already been 
alluded to that picture-proofs and construction do not go together particularly well. In 
this example from Euclid, it is possible to see why. The construction formulae, the 
kataskeue take the form of statements which require some action; e.g., that a line be 
drawn. This type of construction underlies the impmiance of interaction with a picture 
in order to properly grasp it. A picture into Plato's heaven, however, involves no 
interaction whatsoever; it is simply the receiving of information: "I should add that 
the way the picture works is much like direction perception; it is not some smi of 
encoded argument" (Brown, 2008, p. 30). A more lengthy discussion of this, and the 
implications for Brown's view, will be found below. 
7. The State of Picture-Proofs 
12 That is, the construction formulae are proposed in such a way that they are independent of a special 
case; they apply to the general case. 
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Having considered picture-proofs in the context of Greek mathematics, it is now 
possible to draw some conclusions regarding Brown's view. In this analysis of Brown 
so far, there have been no major inconsistencies, either internally or with regards to 
Greek mathematics. Instead, Brown's view has seemed to be one of explanation. 
Brown supports contemporary platonism in the belief that it offers the best 
explanation for mathematical objects. Additionally, Brown's views could be seen as 
explaining much of Greek mathematics. This may not be justification for his views, 
but is it is nevertheless evidence for their scope. The consistency of Brown's view is 
perhaps not what is at stake. Instead, it is their usefulness, both as means of 
explanation and as a means of discovering further mathematics. Through all of the 
above, the former has been established, but the latter remains doubtful. 
Until now, the usefulness of picture-proofs has only been discussed implicitly. Thus 
far, the problems of construction and Folina's view (as discussed in Section 3)-that 
according to Brown, it ought to be the Platonic form, not the visual picture, doing the 
proving-have been hinted at. One final discussion is necessary to bring these points 
together and highlight the problem of usefulness they cause for Brown. Throughout 
this paper, 'picture' has been used as a substitute for 'diagram' as this is Brown's 
terminology. It is worth reflecting on this choice of words as it underlies the common 
thread between the problems of construction and the problems ofFolina. Though 
'picture' and 'diagram' both suggest the representation of visual information, there is 
a subtle difference between them. This difference is manifest in the use of these words 
as verbs. The verb 'to picture' means to form a mental image of something, to 
conceive of it in the mind's eye. Given Brown's earlier pronouncements about the 
reception of the platonic form through the mind's eye, it seems reasonable to assert 
that this was the sense in which he used 'picture'. The verb 'to diagram', by contrast, 
suggests a much more physical, active process; to make a diagram of something. This 
difference underlies an important point: namely, that while the normal use of 
'diagram' suggests taking an active role in representation, the use of 'picture' 
suggests the reception of information through the mind's eye. So, Brown must ignore 
the suggestion of having to interact with a 'diagram' in order to understand it. The 
implication for Brown is that any idea of 'picturing' the Platonic form becomes even 
more abstract. It cannot involve any interaction and so cannot be harnessed in any 
useful fashion. All of this highlights the issue, which Folina draws attention to, that 
the visual picture is of no justificatory use if the Platonic form is the source of 
generality. The picture ceases to be in any way useful and all important 
responsibilities are transfe11'ed to the Platonic form. So, although picture-proofs may 
offer truth, it is an isolated and unhelpful truth. That is, picture-proofs do little to 
advance the cause of non-deductive methods of proof. 
There are, perhaps, ways to remedy this over-abstraction. Firstly, Brown needs to 
establish an extended definition of 'proof in order to include non-deductive evidence. 
It is not sufficient to point out that pictures offer convincing evidence, it is necessary 
to formally define 'proof in such a way that pictorial evidence constitutes 'proof. 
Having done so, this would allow Brown to establish a set of conditions for judging 
whether a picture is indeed a picture-proof. Without these additions, the notion of 
picture-proofs is irrelevant. This is because even if a picture is a picture-proof, there is 
no rigorous way of knowing this. If there is no way of knowing this, then a symbolic 
proof will have to be provided to properly confirm the picture. Having to have a 
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picture confirmed by a proof is against everything which Brown is about, so these 
conditions are absolutely necessary. Without them, pictures are reduced to the use 
which Brown so ardently opposed: to simply aid understanding. 
Even if these improvements were made, and even if the improvements were 
reasonable, the question still remains: is it possible to grasp a picture without 
interaction? That is, is it possible to receive through the mind's eye the information 
from Plato's heaven? If it is accepted that it is, as F olina claims, the platonic form 
which does the justification, then the above improvements suggest that there will be a 
place for the visual picture. If there is a systematic means for judging whether a 
picture is a picture-proof, then the means of judging must involve the visual picture. 
That is, it is difficult to imagine a 'test' for picture-proofs attempting to consider 
objects in Plato's heaven, so the visual picture must play some role. In this sense, it 
seems, that although the platonic form is doing the proving, the visual picture is 
indispensable. This would, to some extent, give the visual picture a place in Brown's 
views where Folina had argued the visual picture would have no significance. 
8. Conclusion 
This paper began by putting forward the strongest possible version of Brown's views 
before considering them in the context of Greek mathematics. Through this, it has 
been established that Brown's views in their cunent incarnation do well in explaining 
but lack in usefulness. As a result of this, it has been argued that Brown must establish 
an expanded formal definition of 'proof and the conditions by which a picture-proof 
can be judged as being a picture-proof. If this is possible, then picture-proofs will 
offer both explanation and usefulness. If it is impossible, as may be the case, then 
there is little to do except acknowledge that picture-proofs may cover a great many 
cases, but do nothing to aid the progress of mathematics. 
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